

9-1626

6 February 1956

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Harold E. Stassen

SUBJECT: Suggested Comments on Stassen Draft Documents:
Letter to Bulganin, Message to Congress, Address
to the Nation

Note: These comments bear on certain problems of presentation and propaganda and not on substantive aspects of the policy outlined. My previous memorandum of 5 December 1955 dealt with the latter.

1. When these drafts are put into more finished form, as we assume they will be, they ought to convey somewhat more positively that the US proposals are intended as steps toward actual disarmament. We have repeatedly emphasized in our estimates that world opinion, under the strain of growing nuclear plenty, increasingly wants "disarmament." It sees this as a simple matter of cutting down armaments and does not see all the pitfalls and loopholes involved. The Soviets are capitalizing extensively on this desire by talking crudely of simple arms cuts and banning nuclear weapons. In essence, our position is that we too want disarmament but that we cannot and will not accept it without an adequate inspection system, and that in fact such a system would provide for better guarantees against war than a loose and unenforceable arms agreement by itself. But if we are to achieve the objectives of the Stassen proposals, we must make crystal clear this vital connection between arms limitation and inspection. We must say "We are for disarmament, but . . .", not merely "We are for inspection, and . . .". From the standpoint of psychological impact, the draft Stassen messages should highlight the disarmament aspect more, particularly since this is the chief point on which the Soviets have criticized our proposals.

2. The proposal to provide the Arms Regulation Council with nuclear weapons for enforcement is obscure as presented and likely to produce unfavorable reactions. Given the prejudice against nuclear weapons as such, world opinion is not likely to take kindly to the idea of employing these weapons as a means of enforcement. This is likely to be construed as a US effort to establish legitimacy for "tactical" nuclear weapons and to raise doubts as to the seriousness of the US purpose to proceed toward disarmament. Moreover, the USSR would not favor allowing any such agency, in which it is likely to

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have a minority voice, to amass nuclear weapons which could be used against its interests. Enforcement against a major nuclear power by an international agency would not be practical in any case and attempted enforcement with nuclear weapons could provide the occasion for nuclear war. In practice the ARC could employ its nuclear weapons for enforcement only against violators other than the major nuclear powers, and then only if the USSR and US agreed. This would put the US and USSR in the position of acting jointly as nuclear policemen for the rest of the world.

3. The timing of the modest reductions "within the first year" needs clarification. Do these take place beginning immediately the inspection system is in place or after a year of experience with it? Is agreement on these reciprocal reductions a part of the agreement to set up the inspection system or is it to be negotiated once the latter is in place?

4. One important question which seems certain to be raised is the absence of specific provision for inspection and reduction of armed strength in Communist Asia. Without inspection of the territory of Communist China the USSR would have wide opportunities for evasion and China itself could prepare aggression against peripheral free world areas without danger of detection. Moreover, if the proposed reductions in US strength occurred and there was no parallel reduction of Communist Chinese forces, the threat to Korea, Formosa, and Southeast Asia would be increased and the capability of the US to counter it reduced.

5. One of the arguments the USSR has already made against the Eisenhower aerial inspection proposal is that it was merely a "gigantic intelligence-gathering operation." A similar argument is likely to be advanced against the inspection scheme as a whole. Would it not be wise to anticipate this, boldly granting that it is the purpose of the scheme to remove the secrecy surrounding military forces since this secrecy itself is an important cause of international tensions? It could be pointed out that the disclosure is mutual, and that removing the fear of surprise attack is of as great benefit to the USSR as to the US.

6. It is suggested that in the draft message to Congress the sentence at the end of the fourth paragraph on page 2 be removed. It is inconsistent with National Intelligence Estimates to suggest that mounting capabilities on both sides to deliver quick and annihilating blows necessarily means "serious danger of war." This would be likely to develop only if one side gained a major edge over the other. For example, the continued growth of nuclear capabilities during 1955 has not proved incompatible with some "reduction" in tensions; indeed it

has been one of the factors leading both sides to favor some reduction. This sentence could simply be removed and the burden of this argument left to the third paragraph on page 6, which in any case seems somewhat inconsistent with the sentence referred to above.

7. By and large, the impact of these proposals is likely to be positive in a propaganda sense, mainly because they outline certain practical steps which will convey the impression that the US is earnestly trying to move the subject of disarmament forward. This is particularly true of the suggestions for test areas and for exchange of officers to be trained in inspection techniques.

8. There can be no question of a positive reaction by the USSR, however. The Soviets have moved more and more openly in recent months toward rejection of the President's Geneva proposals. They will doubtless have serious propaganda difficulties with the US proposals, and will probably fall back on a shrill repetition of their standard themes: large-scale reductions to fixed levels (1,500,000 men) and "ban the bomb." The US presentation in all these documents should anticipate these lines of Soviet argument wherever possible in order to reduce the effect of Soviet counter-propaganda and retain the initiative for the US case.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

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Remarks: A possible draft for the Director's signature as per our discussion of Monday morning.

NOTE: Mr. Stassen has asked that comments be sent to his office by noon Tuesday, 7 February.

S. KENT

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